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INTRODUCTION 
The Trump presidency has provided urban politicians a chance at 
national prominence, as urban leaders across the country assert their 
ability to implement progressive policies at the local level.  For 
example, after President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Climate Accords, mayors of major U.S. cities vowed to meet the Paris 
goals on their own,1 and the Climate Mayors, a group of municipal 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University.  I am honored to be among those participating in this symposium issue of 
the Fordham Urban Law Journal exploring a reimagined localism.  It is an apt time to 
reconsider localism.  I wish to thank Frank Kearl for organizing the symposium and 
inviting me to participate.  I would also like to thank Frank, Traci Krasne, Miyoshie 
Lamothe-Aime for their thoughtful editorial suggestions, and Ruth Tziporah Scharff-
Bendor, who came into being only slightly faster than this Essay got written. 
 1. See Press Release, Martin J. Walsh, Mayor of the City of Boston, Statement 
from Mayor Walsh on Paris Climate Agreement (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.boston.gov/news/statement-mayor-walsh-paris-climate-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/3RBB-3LZ5]; Press Release, Rahm Emanuel, Mayor of the City of 
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leaders pledging to take action on climate change, has swelled to 407 
mayors, representing cities both large and small.2  Similarly, urban 
leaders have opposed President Trump’s efforts to deport 
undocumented immigrants.  Boston mayor Martin Walsh declared 
that, “[i]f necessary, we will use City Hall itself to shelter and protect 
anyone who’s targeted unjustly,” and told reporters that those who 
fear deportation “can use my office, they can use any office in this 
building.”3 Several jurisdictions, including San Francisco and Santa 
Clara, filed a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s Executive Order 
cutting federal funding for “sanctuary cities” — municipalities that 
attempt to limit federal immigration enforcement in their 
jurisdictions.4 
Urban politicians have also sought to fill the void in progressive 
leadership at the state level.  For example, mayors and local 
governments have tried to push state legislatures to allow more local 
regulation of guns.5  They have also advocated for, and implemented, 
 
Chi., Statement from Mayor Emanuel on Paris Agreement (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2017/m
ay/ParisAgreement.html [https://perma.cc/U8R9-MT9D]; Press Release, Megan 
Barry, Mayor of the City of Nashville, Mayor Barry Statement on Paris Agreement 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nashville.gov/News-Media/News-Article/ID/6458/Mayor-
Barry-Statement-on-Paris-Agreement.aspx [https://perma.cc/YQ4X-GWBG]; Press 
Release, Bill De Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Statement from Mayor de Blasio on US 
Withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement (June 1, 2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/381-17/statement-mayor-de-blasio-us-
withdrawal-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/L4MM-UQTF]; Eli Watkins, 
Pittsburgh Mayor Hits Back After Trump Invokes City in Climate Speech, CNN 
POLITICS (June 2, 2017, 1:09 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/01/politics/pittsburgh-mayor-donald-trump/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/6JYU-HZ9L]; Press Release, Eric Garcetti, Mayor of the City of 
L.A., Mayor Garcetti Leads ‘Climate Mayors’ to Oppose U.S. Withdrawal from Paris 
Agreement (June 1, 2017), https://www.lamayor.org/mayor-garcetti-leads-
%E2%80%98climate-mayors%E2%80%99-oppose-us-withdrawal-paris-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/BLJ2-38R8]. 
 2. Members, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/about/members/ 
[https://perma.cc/FK8R-MMYE]. 
 3. Steve LeBlanc, Boston Mayor Vows to Use City Hall to Shelter Immigrants, 
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/25/boston-mayor-vows-to-use-city-
hall-to-shelter-immi/ [https://perma.cc/3NW5-YXS7]. 
 4. See Camila Domonoske, Judge Blocks Trump Administration from Punishing 
‘Sanctuary Cities,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 21, 2017, 12:48 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/21/565678707/enter-title 
[https://perma.cc/G2MY-5UXJ]. 
 5. See Andrew Gillum et al., Opinion, Mayor Wants to Pass Gun Safety Laws, 
but the NRA and Our State Legislatures Won’t Let Us, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2018, 
7:52 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/23/mayors-want-gun-
control-but-blocked-nra-preemption-laws-column/450893002/ 
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policies on a range of issues of national concern, including efforts to 
curb obesity and related health issues,6 protect the environment,7 
promote participatory democracy,8 improve working conditions for 
low-income workers,9 and safeguard civil rights protections.10 
 
[https://perma.cc/6FN6-TLJY]; Sarah Holder, The Escalating City-State Battle over 
Guns, CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/who-has-the-
right-to-govern-your-guns/558119/ [https://perma.cc/75A7-UHXU]. 
 6. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of 
Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1237–41 (2014). 
 7. See Nadia S. Adawi, State Preemption of Local Control over Intensive 
Livestock Operations, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10506, 10511 (2014).  
There is particularly voluminous literature on local fracking bans. See, e.g., Colin C. 
Deihl et al., Tug of War over Colorado’s Energy Future: State Preemption of Local 
Fracking Bans, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10524, 10525 (2014); Stephen 
Elkind, Preemption and Home-Rule: The Power of Local Governments to Ban or 
Burden Hydraulic Fracturing, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 415, 415–16 (2016); 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an 
Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New York, 77 ALB. L. REV. 
647, 648 (2014); Jamal Knight & Bethany Gullman, The Power of State Interest: 
Preemption of Local Fracking Ordinances in Home-Rule Cities, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
297, 297 (2015); Alex Ritchie, Fracking in Louisiana: The Missing Process/Land Use 
Distinction in State Preemption and Opportunities for Local Participation, 76 LA. L. 
REV. 809, 811–13 (2016); Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental 
Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2015); David B. Spence, The Political 
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 351–52 (2014); Rachel A. Kitze, 
Note, Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the Power of Local Governments over 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (2013); Adam J. Loos, Comment, 
When Prohibition Is Not Regulation: Analyzing the Court’s Decision in Wallach v. 
Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 121–22 (2015); 
Bryan M. Weynand, Comment, Placing the Seal on a Fractured Debate: How North 
Carolina Clarified Its Law of Hydraulic Fracturing and Can Strike the Right Balance 
with Preemption of Local Regulation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 596, 597 (2015). 
 8. See Brian Wampler, Power to Participate: Engaging Citizens in Urban 
Planning, BLUE REVIEW (Sept. 18, 2013), https://thebluereview.org/participatory-
democracy-planning/ [https://perma.cc/9JG7-7E7H] (discussing local government 
agency in Idaho seeking to promote citizen involvement in public decision-making); 
Hollie Russon Gilman, The Moment for Participatory Democracy, Three Civic 
Engagement Models that Can Help Bring the Voices of Everyday Citizens into 
Public Life, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_moment_for_participatory_democracy# 
[https://perma.cc/V873-3W93] (mentioning ways local governments are encouraging 
public participation). 
 9. E.g., Marni von Wilpert, City Governments Are Raising Standards for 
Working People–and State Legislatures Are Lowering Them Back Down, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-
raising-standards-for-working-people-and-state-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-
down/ [https://perma.cc/5S2T-SAZX] (discussing ways local governments are 
responding to state preemption of local wage and labor standards ordinances). 
 10. E.g., Simon Davis-Cohen, The States Are Attacking Local Civil Rights Law, 
PROGRESSIVE (May 31, 2018), http://progressive.org/dispatches/the-states-are-
attacking-local-civil-rights-law/ [https://perma.cc/4PUX-ZSRF] (noting that local 
ordinances offer protections to LGBTQ persons in absence of state-wide 
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Reimagined localism reflects excitement about cities as 
laboratories for policy experimentation.  These efforts paint the 
picture of increasingly active and powerful local governments and 
local officials.  The picture, however, is more complicated than these 
anecdotes suggest. 
As academic and political advocates of local power observe, efforts 
to implement progressive policies at the local level have drawn the ire 
of state legislatures and governors.11  State legislators are both 
proposing and passing more laws preempting local authority.12  
Traditionally, state preemption laws simply took away local 
regulatory authority, but these new “hyper preemption” efforts go 
beyond that.13  These new preemption laws increasingly seek to 
punish local governments and local officials for passing and enforcing 
regulations that exceed local authority and thereby directly threaten 
local regulatory innovation.14  Traditional and hyper preemption 
statutes, however, are not the only constraints on local autonomy. 
Fiscal constraints also significantly limit local autonomy.15  State 
law restricts local governments’ abilities both to tax and to borrow.16  
Local governments may also face practical limits on their ability to 
raise taxes without inviting an exodus of local businesses or residents.  
For example, even jurisdictions with authority to set their own sales 
 
protections); see also Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case 
of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148–50 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. 
L. REV. 1995, 1997–2002 (2018); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health 
“Preemption Plus,” 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 156 (2017); Erin A. Scharff, Hyper 
Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 
1471–72 (2018) [hereinafter Hyper Preemption]; Richard C. Schragger, The Attack 
on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018); see also Emily Badger, Blue Cities 
Want to Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-their-
own-rules-red-states-wont-let-them.html [https://perma.cc/XZ98-LEUQ]; see 
generally Richard Briffault et al., The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The 
Assault on Progressive Cities and How Cities Can Respond, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR 
L. & POL’Y ISSUE BRIEF (Sept. 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-_Preemption_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BFN-FUST] [hereinafter Troubling Turn]. 
 12. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1471–72; see also supra notes 10 and 
11. 
 13. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1471–72. 
 14. Id. at 1473. 
 15. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES 
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 212 (2008). 
 16. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 
476–77 tbl. A1 (2001); see generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. 
U.L. REV. 1241 (2009) [hereinafter Fiscal Home Rule]. 
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tax rates face tax competition from neighboring jurisdictions, which 
limits the amount of revenue that could be collected by raising sales 
tax rates.17  As a result, local governments often lack the independent 
resources necessary to pursue policies favored by local residents. 
Hyper preemption efforts depend on fiscal constraints because the 
threat of fiscal sanctions dissuades localities from challenging state 
preemption legislation.  Localities fear these sanctions because they 
would struggle to compensate for the considerable revenue loss that 
would result from the imposition of such sanctions.18  But the 
relationship between fiscal constraints and hyper preemption runs 
even deeper.19  Limits on local fiscal autonomy likely influence local 
interest in regulatory policy in the first place.  For example, fiscal 
constraints may prevent local officials from expanding progressive 
spending programs, while in actuality, progressive regulatory policies 
may impose few direct costs on local government and may be a 
cheaper way of implementing a progressive policy agenda. 
Fiscal constraints are likely to increase, at least in the near future.  
First, cities will face increasing pressure to spend more on public 
pensions and infrastructure maintenance to make up for earlier 
underinvestment in these areas.  Second, cities will face pressure from 
changes in federal budget policies. 
This Essay explores the relationship between local fiscal and 
regulatory authority in light of the changing landscape of regulatory 
preemption.  Part I provides further background on local fiscal 
authority and the ways in which hyper preemption depends on limited 
local authority.  Part II explores the ways in which limited fiscal 
authority may contribute to a renewed interest in local regulatory 
authority, and discusses the reasons these constraints are likely to 
 
 17. Erin A. Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and 
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 325–26 (2016) [hereinafter 
Powerful Cities]. 
 18. E.g., Complaint at 5, City of Tucson v. Arizona, C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 12, 2016) (noting that state-share revenue is about 23.5% of Tucson’s general 
revenue fund); Ari Shapiro & Jude Joffe Block, Arizona Law Targets City 
Governments by Cutting off Funds, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/19/506199963/arizona-law-targets-city-governments-by-
cutting-off-funds [https://perma.cc/B5LN-TPYV] (noting that Tucson faced losing all 
of its shared revenue from the State if found non-compliant with Arizona state law); 
Henry Graber, Phoenix Has Beef with Arizona, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/09/phoenix_mayor_greg_stant
on_is_fed_up_with_arizona_pre_empting_his_city_s.html [https://perma.cc/9A46-
LGV3] (reporting Phoenix mayor’s frustration with Arizona’s preemption statute 
assertion, contending it has a chilling effect on liberal cities). 
 19. See Troubling Turn, supra note 11. 
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increase.  Part III argues that these increasing fiscal constraints both 
limit local governments’ ability to adequately address matters of 
traditional local concern and hinder local governments’ ability to 
respond to leadership failures at the state and national levels. 
I. LOCAL AUTONOMY AND LOCAL DEPENDENCE 
All states grant some authority to local governments.  Most states 
provide for some version of home rule, at least for larger 
jurisdictions.20  Home rule provides local governments with authority 
to act without prior state approval.21  Moreover, even in traditional 
Dillon’s Rule states, where local governments may exercise only 
those powers expressly granted by state law, municipalities have some 
implied authority to act in ways necessary to carry out those 
delegated powers.22  Nevertheless, local governments are creatures of 
state law, and their legal authority to regulate, to tax, and even to 
exist, depends upon state law.  Political and practical constraints limit 
this authority even further. 
This Part first provides background on the fiscal constraints that 
local governments face.  It then discusses in more detail the ways in 
which these constraints interact with emerging state efforts to restrict 
local regulatory authority. 
A. Local Fiscal Constraints 
Local fiscal autonomy is limited both by state law restrictions on 
local revenue authority and by practical constraints on the ability to 
exercise this authority.  Any discussion about local fiscal autonomy 
must acknowledge the significant role the state plays in funding local 
governments. 
Cities receive funding through state aid and federal grant 
programs.23  Data from 2010 suggests that, on average, state aid 
 
 20. See generally KRANE ET AL., supra note 16 (providing descriptions of home 
rule authority (or lack thereof) in all fifty states). 
 21. See Fiscal Home Rule, supra note 16. 
 22. See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public 
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 963 (1991) 
(“As formulated by its author — judge and treatise writer John F. Dillon — the 
doctrine limits localities to exercise of those powers expressly delegated to them by 
the state legislature or necessary to implement or necessarily implied from express 
legislative grants.”). 
 23. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS (2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43967_FederalGrants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3GJ5-E9A3] (describing federal grants to local governments); Erica 
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constituted slightly less than one-third of local government 
revenues.24  This average, however, masks important differences 
between states and types of local governments.25  For example, the 
same data also illustrates that local governments in Vermont received 
about sixty percent of their revenue from the state, while Nebraska 
only provided about eighteen percent of local government revenue.26  
Additionally, municipalities and townships are generally less reliant 
on state aid than local school districts.27 Despite these variations, 
however, state grants provide an important source of local 
government funding for almost all jurisdictions. 
States vary in the ways they contribute state dollars to local 
governments.  Typically, states provide much of their funding through 
general aid, which allocates a percentage of state revenue to local 
government based on fixed distribution formulas.28  Distribution 
formulas often consider factors like population size and local needs.29  
The formulas may also reflect a desire to return revenues to the 
jurisdiction where the tax dollars are earned, so a state may allocate 
some portion of the state sales tax to the jurisdiction in which the sale 
occurs.30  States also use other methods.  Arizona, for example, 
allocates its state shared revenue from the state sales tax using a 
formula that weighs a jurisdiction’s property tax revenue.31 
States also provide funding to local governments for specific 
programs in addition to general funding.  For example, Arizona 
provides dedicated funding to county and municipal libraries,32 and 
Arkansas’ Historic Preservation Program provides funding to restore 
 
Michel, State Aid to Local Governments, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-aid-to-local-government-update.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3ZDR-6ALZ]. 
 24. Michel, supra note 23. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
A PUNISHING DECADE FOR SCHOOL FUNDING (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/a-punishing-decade-for-school-
funding [https://perma.cc/8FWZ-5D9Z] (highlighting K-12 schools’ dependence on 
state funding and noting that, on average, school districts receive about forty-seven 
percent of their funding from the state). 
 28. See Michel, supra note 23. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5029 (2018). 
 32. See, e.g., State Grants-In-Aid (SGIA), ARIZ. ST. LIBR., ARCHIVES & PUB. 
REC., https://azlibrary.gov/libdev/funding/sgi [https://perma.cc/4J7H-48SE]. 
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historic county courthouses.33  In Indiana, local governments can 
apply for state aid to fund efforts to reduce water pollution.34  Ohio’s 
Attorney General’s Office provides grants to local law enforcement 
to assist in combating the state’s opioid epidemic.35 
State influence on municipal budgets is not limited to direct 
support.  States exercise significant influence over local governments’ 
ability to raise revenue via taxes and their ability to borrow.36  As a 
result, local governments often lack meaningful fiscal autonomy. 
Generally, state law restricts municipal authority over fiscal affairs 
more than it does in other policy areas.37  One leading survey of 
municipal home rule found that only twelve states provide local 
governments with fiscal control, but five of those states have only 
limited fiscal authority.38  Beyond home rule, other constitutional 
restrictions may also restrict local budget choices.39  Seattle’s head tax 
on employees, for example, was developed in part because of the 
city’s limited fiscal options.40  It has already aggressively raised 
property taxes (and additional increases would likely exacerbate the 
 
 33. AHPP Accepting Applications for Courthouse, Restoration Grants, ARK. 
HIST. PRESERVATION PROGRAM (Nov. 17, 2017), 
http://www.arkansaspreservation.com/blog/ahpp-accepting-applications-for-
courthouse-restoration-grants [https://perma.cc/DC3X-L6M5]. 
 34. See Funding, IND. DEP’T OF ENVTL. MGMT. (2018), 
https://www.in.gov/idem/4103.htm [https://perma.cc/6KRX-X7B6]. 
 35. Press Release, Mike DeWine, Ohio Att’y Gen., Three Million in Grants for 
DART and QRT Teams Awarded to Address Opioid Epidemic (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/September-2017/Three-
Million-in-Grants-for-DART-and-QRT-Teams-Awa [https://perma.cc/C9KQ-
ZV9Q]. 
 36. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal 
Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J.  907, 915–16 (2003) (discussing 
state constitutional limits on municipal borrowing authority); see, e.g., Liz Green-
Taylor, Local Debt Limitations Primer – Washington State Department of 
Commerce, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE (May 2014), 
https://www.commerce.wa.gov/about-us/research-services/bond-users-
clearinghouse/local-debt-limitations-primer/ [https://perma.cc/EKR2-DTB2] 
(discussing Washington State government’s process to determine how much more 
debt a local government can assume). 
 37. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 16, at 474, 476–77 (categorizing the powers that 
states grant under home rule). 
 38. See id. at 471, 476–77 (listing extent of fiscal home rule authority in each 
state). 
 39. See Fiscal Home Rule, supra note 16, at 1246. 
 40. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Richard C. Auxier, Seattle’s Head Tax Is a Fine 
Idea, Given the Circumstances, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 11, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/seattles-head-tax-fine-idea-given-
circumstances [https://perma.cc/8RHU-428Q] (stating that the head tax required 
companies to pay twenty-six cents for every hour an employee worked). 
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city’s affordable housing problem), and the city lacks authority to 
impose an income tax under state law.41 
Finally, horizontal and vertical tax competition imposes practical 
limits on a local government’s ability to raise tax revenue by 
increasing tax rates.  Horizontal tax competition is tax competition 
between neighboring jurisdictions.42  For example, sales tax rates in 
neighboring suburbs will likely be relatively similar because greater 
differentials in tax rates would push shoppers to a neighboring 
jurisdiction.43  In contrast, vertical tax competition is tax competition 
between overlapping levels of government.44  For example, a state’s 
sales tax rate limits a locality’s ability to generate sales tax revenue 
from a tax increase. The state sales tax pushes up the overall level of 
sales tax, and thus affects consumer demand for products. 
B. States Can Limit Local Regulatory Authority Too  
While states generally provide local governments with some 
authority to regulate as a way to protect the public welfare, the state’s 
ability to preempt local ordinances often limits this authority.  This 
section discusses the state’s preemption authority, including reasons 
why states may want to limit local authority.  It also describes the 
increasingly aggressive use of this preemption authority and 
concludes by discussing possible limits. 
While local governments traditionally have had greater regulatory 
than fiscal authority, the state’s preemption powers have always 
limited regulatory authority.45  Even in jurisdictions granting 
relatively broad authority to local governments, states retain the right 
to preempt local regulations on matters of statewide concern.46  Local 
regulation of activity often has spillover effects, so the state will have 
a persuasive argument that it is regulating on a matter of statewide 
concern. 
Consider a law requiring a municipal living wage higher than 
minimum wage imposed by federal and state laws.  While such a law 
could only apply to workers employed within the jurisdiction, the 
State can reasonably argue that wages are a matter of statewide 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Competition, Benefit Taxes, and Fiscal 
Federalism, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 579, 581 (1998). 
 43. Powerful Cities, supra note 17, at 321–22. 
 44. See Goodspeed, supra note 42, at 581. 
 45. Powerful Cities, supra note 17, at 339–40. 
 46. See generally Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 
(2007). 
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concern.  First, the state can assert it has an interest in employment 
regulation uniformity, so that companies operating in multiple 
jurisdictions do not have to master multiple legal regimes, thereby 
increasing compliance costs, and thus, the cost of doing business in 
the state.  Second, the state can argue that the wage rate in one 
jurisdiction will affect the wages employers must offer in neighboring 
jurisdictions as well; thus, it has an interest in limiting these spillover 
effects to ensure that high wages do not increase unemployment or 
make the state unattractive to business.  State courts have usually 
been deferential to such arguments.47 
In recent years, state preemption efforts have become even more 
aggressive. In the past, states found it sufficient to deny local 
governments the authority to act, rendering preempted local 
ordinances ultra vires.48  Now, state legislatures are increasingly 
debating (and passing) bills that seek not only to limit local authority, 
but also to sanction local governments and local public officials that 
run afoul of state preemption laws.49  Most of these sanctions are 
financial, with state law imposing fines on both governments that 
adopt ordinances preempted by state law and on local officials who 
enforce these ordinances.50  However, some states have also sought 
additional authority, such as to remove local elected officials.51 
Hyper preemption legislation often provides significant fiscal 
sanctions for local governments found to be in violation of state law.  
For example, Arizona enacted a law in 2015 that imposed significant 
fiscal sanctions on localities that adopt ordinances that state 
authorities find violate state law.52  If Arizona’s attorney general 
concludes that an ordinance violates state law, the law provides a 
short period for the jurisdiction to repeal the ordinance.53  If the local 
government refuses to repeal the ordinance, the law directs the 
attorney general to instruct the state treasurer to withhold state 
shared revenue from the jurisdiction until the ordinance is repealed.54  
For Tucson, the sanction threatened about a quarter of its general 
 
 47. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990). 
 48. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1476–79. 
 49. Id. at 1495. 
 50. Id. 
 51. FLA. STAT. § 790.33 (2018). 
 52. See S. 1487, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-
194.01 (2016). 
 53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2016). 
 54. Id. 
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revenue fund.55  Tucson tried to challenge the constitutionality of 
Arizona’s preemption statute regarding a dispute over Tucson’s 
policy of destroying certain guns seized by police officers.56  State law 
required such guns to be sold to the public.57  In adjudicating the 
challenge, the Arizona Supreme Court found Tucson’s gun ordinance 
preempted, and it rejected many of the city’s constitutional 
arguments.58 
Other preemption bills impose fiscal sanctions only for specific 
conflicts with state law.  For example, legislation seeking to restrict 
the local adoption of a “sanctuary city” policy often provides fiscal 
sanctions for adopting such policies.  Arizona’s S.B. 1070, for 
example, established civil fines of up to $5,000 for each day that a 
locality was in violation of a state law requiring local law 
enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officers and 
enforce immigration law.59  Michigan’s proposed legislation would 
have prohibited local governments from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] 
any law . . . that limits or prohibits a[n] . . . officer . . . from 
communicating or cooperating with appropriate federal officials 
concerning the immigration status of an individual in this state.”60  
The proposed Michigan law would have required the state treasurer 
to withhold state revenue sharing funds from local governments 
that fail to comply with this order.61  Similar Florida legislation 
would impose a fine of at least $1,000 a day for sanctuary policies 
adopted contrary to state law and would prohibit a locality from 
receiving any state grant funding for a five-year period beginning 
on the date the locality is adjudicated to be in violation of the 
statute.62 
There may be both legal and political limits to the state’s 
preemption authority.  As several local government scholars note, 
some state constitutions limit state authority over certain aspects of 
local government regulation.63 Additionally, various state political 
 
 55. Complaint at 5, City of Tucson v. Arizona, No. C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 12, 2016). 
 56. Id. at 2, 14. 
 57. Id. at 14. 
 58. State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 669 (Ariz. 2017). 
 59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010). 
 60. H.R. 4105, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017). 
 61. Id. (stating that the treasurer “shall withhold the total annual payment 
amount that the local unit of government receives under the Glenn Steil state 
revenue sharing act of 1971 . . . ”). 
 62. S. 786, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 63. See generally Troubling Turn, supra note 11. 
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process rules, like single-subject requirements,64 may mean that 
certain preemption bills run afoul of state constitutional rules.65  
Further, current litigation challenges some state preemption efforts 
under the federal constitution.66 
Political constraints may also limit state preemption efforts.67  As 
Professor Richard Schragger observes, business interests worked to 
defeat bills copying North Carolina’s controversial law, H.B. 2—
which preempted local government anti-discrimination ordinances—
and North Carolina itself faced considerable economic pressure to 
repeal its legislation.68  This type of political pressure may be limited.  
In many cases, it is these same business interests pushing preemption 
legislation.69 
C. Hyper Preemption’s Success Depends on Limited Local Fiscal 
Authority  
While scholars have observed this punitive turn in preemption 
law,70  the connection between hyper preemption and limited fiscal 
authority has not yet been a focus of this scholarship.  Indeed, hyper 
preemption efforts are intimately intertwined with limits on local 
fiscal autonomy.  The threat of sanctions limits local policy autonomy 
precisely because local governments lack the fiscal capacity to bear 
these sanctions.  In this sense, hyper preemption leaves cities doubly 
vulnerable: the costs of litigation to deter local governments from 
acting, and the threat of sanctions, on top of those court costs, make 
resistance potentially self-defeating. 
It is possible that hyper preemption policies have not yet reached 
the heart of state power over local finances.  Current versions of these 
bills threaten to remove state funding when a city violates a state law 
 
 64. Id. at 12–13.  Single-subject requirements ensure that when the legislature 
votes on a particular bill, that bill only addresses on particular policy issue.  For 
example, the same bill could not address both school funding and qualifications for 
elected office in the state. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018) (involving claim that Texas 
preemption statute regarding immigration violated federal Constitution). 
 67. Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1518–20; Schragger, supra note 11, at 
1226–30. 
 68. Schragger, supra note 11, at 1228–30. 
 69. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to 
Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403 (2017). 
 70. See supra note 12. 
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or creates fiscal sanctions (payable to the state) for such violations,71 
but states could also condition funding on cities adhering to a list of 
policies.  At the federal level, restrictions to the congressional 
spending power might limit such conditional funding, 72 but there is 
no analog to this limit in most state constitutions.73 
State governments can also threaten local government funding to 
retaliate against local policies. Such retaliation takes several forms.  
First, state governments could cut discretionary grants to local 
governments.  For example, the State of Tennessee recently withdrew 
previously authorized financial support for the City of Memphis’s 
bicentennial celebration.74  State legislators voting in favor of the 
funding cut made it clear that they did so in response to Memphis’s 
legal efforts to remove Confederate statues from city parks.75  
Because state law prevented the city itself from removing the statues, 
the city sold the statues and the land underneath to a not-for-profit, 
which subsequently removed them.76  Legal theories challenging the 
state’s actions are, at best, untested.  The state’s discretionary 
spending programs are precisely that, discretionary, and the 
legislature has broad authority to redirect such program funding. 
Second, state governments could reduce local fiscal authority more 
generally.  Such a move need not be retaliatory.  In fact, state officials 
that support the deregulatory agenda of hyper preemption are also 
likely to support limited local taxing authority.  Leaders in Texas’ 
Republican Party, including Governor Greg Abbot and Lieutenant 
Governor Dan Patrick, have endorsed a plan to limit local property 
tax growth by making it far easier for local voters to limit a locality’s 
ability to raise revenue.77  While moderates defeated a similar plan in 
 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
 72. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
 73. See, e.g., Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at n.226. 
 74. Sheila Burke, Tennessee Lawmakers Punish Memphis for Removing Statues, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/17ec9774415240b0a7b1ec41d923eb3c [https://perma.cc/GUB9-
4WVZ]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Daniel Connolly & Vivian Wang, Confederate Statues in Memphis Are 
Removed After City Council Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/statue-memphis-removed.html 
[https://perma.cc/4MWU-W7B7]. 
 77. Phil Brazan, Abbot, Patrick Throwing Weight Behind Property Tax Reform 
in GOP Primary, KXAN (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:52 PM), 
https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/abbott-patrick-throwing-weight-behind-
property-tax-reform-in-gop-primary_20180312075734707/1031501913 
[https://perma.cc/EM2X-4CQY]. 
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Texas’s last legislative session,78 the leader of the moderate wing of 
the Texas Republic Party, House Speaker Joe Straus, is not seeking 
reelection.79  Local officials fear the proposal would make it much 
harder for them to balance their budgets.80  While the Texas reform is 
not explicitly tied to the state’s preemption agenda, it clearly targets 
urban areas.  Like hyper preemption legislation, these state fiscal 
limits imply a distrust of local voters to decide for themselves how to 
regulate local revenue. Texas is not the only state considering limiting 
local property taxes; members of the Illinois legislature have 
introduced a bill that would allow more local voters to weigh in on 
property tax changes, creating an additional roadblock for city 
officials seeking to raise property taxes.81 
II.  FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CITY 
Fiscal constraints also shape regulation. Regulatory ordinances are 
often cheaper to implement than other progressive policies, which 
require more direct government outlay.  For example, consider the 
policy choices facing an urban leader who wants to improve the lives 
of working parents, especially the working poor.  Providing those 
parents with additional childcare assistance would require a direct 
outlay of government revenue.  On the other hand, there are few 
 
 78. Morgan Smith & Patrick Svitek, Texas Legislature Ends Special Session 
Without Passing Property Tax Measure, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/15/texas-house-adjourns-sine-die 
[https://perma.cc/DN8U-D2LC]. 
 79. Matthew Watkins, Texas House Speaker Joe Straus Says He Will Not Seek 
Re-Election, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/25/speaker-house-joe-straus-wont-seek-
reelection/ [https://perma.cc/SLL7-6PAH]. 
 80. See generally Dagney Pruner, Dallas Mayor, First Responders Speak Against 
Property Tax Bill at Heated Hearing, DALL. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-politics/2017/03/14/dallas-mayor-first-
responders-speak-property-tax-bill-heated-hearing [https://perma.cc/DPL6-XWPT]; 
Clay Falls, College Station Mayor Worried About Property Tax Changes, KBRX-
TV3 (July 18, 2017, 6:49 PM), http://www.kbtx.com/content/news/College-Station-
Mayor-worried-about-property-tax-changes-during-special-session-435263343.html 
[https://perma.cc/T3DL-F576]; Dave Montgomery, Local Leaders Decry Proposed 
Property Tax Overhaul, STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:17 PM), 
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/state/texas/article138537823.html 
[https://perma.cc/H3HR-GUJL]; Wes Rapaport, Emergency Responders Announce 
Opposition to Property Tax Bill, KXAN (Aug. 9, 2017, 2:48 P.M.), 
https://www.kxan.com/news/emergency-responders-announce-opposition-to-
property-tax-bill/994662380 [https://perma.cc/6G28-5HWT]. 
 81. Illinois Proposal Could Lead to More Property Tax Cuts, CBS CHI. (Apr. 23, 
2018, 12:08 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2018/04/23/illinois-proposal-could-lead-
to-property-tax-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/3KAR-MVHS]. 
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direct costs to requiring local businesses to offer workers a 
predictable schedule (so that childcare is easier to arrange) and paid 
sick days (so that workers can afford to take time off to care for their 
children). 
This Part discusses factors that shape urban leaders’ interest in the 
creative use of their regulatory authority, including the role that fiscal 
constraints play.  It then suggests that such constraints are likely to 
remain and argues that these constraints are likely to increase in the 
near term. 
A. Limited Autonomy Influences the Local Regulatory Agenda 
Local leaders have led the way on a variety of innovative 
regulatory efforts in recent years.82  For example, local governments 
spearheaded efforts to improve nutrition by limiting soda sizes, taxing 
high sugar beverages, and adding calorie counts to restaurant 
menus.83  Local governments have also sought to address the 
environmental effects of fracking and factory farming84 and have 
been policy leaders on important issues of work-life balance, like 
predictable scheduling and paid sick days.85  There are many 
explanations for this local regulatory innovation. This section 
considers several that have been offered.  It then argues that legal 
constraints on local authority may nudge local leaders’ interest in 
these policy areas.  Other areas, like public pensions, that also require 
attention from urban leaders are harder to address because of existing 
constraints on local authority. 
There are many reasons local leaders have been increasingly 
willing to experiment with progressive regulatory policies.  Local 
leaders themselves often argue that they are stepping in because the 
 
 82. See supra notes 6–11; see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Political 
Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 129–30 (2017) (discussing 
municipalities pushing for social welfare policies such as living wage movement and 
sanctuary cities). 
 83. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6, at 1239; see generally Beverly Bird, What Is the 
Soda Tax and Which Cities Have One?, BALANCE (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/soda-tax-and-which-cities-have-one-4151209 
[https://perma.cc/TLC5-VU6K]. 
 84. See supra note 8. 
 85. See von Wilpert, supra note 10, at nn.35, 39–40; see also Matt Crawley, Paid 
Sick Leave Legislation Taking States, Municipalities by Storm, MULTISTATE INSIDER 
(July 21, 2016), https://www.multistate.us/blog/insider/2016/07/paid-sick-leave-
legislationtaking-states-municipalities-by-storm [https://perma.cc/928Q-JRG3]. 
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state and national leadership is not responsive to their constituents.86  
According to Frank Sharry, a leading immigrant-rights advocate, 
mayors committing to the preservation of sanctuary cities, for 
example, “are not getting out in front of public opinion . . . but 
reflecting it.”87  Or, as San Antonio mayor Ron Nirenberg put it, 
“[t]he fundamental truth about the whole debate over local control is 
that taking authority away from cities — preventing us from carrying 
out the wishes of our constituents — is subverting the will of the 
voter.”88  Of course, the preferences of voters statewide may differ 
dramatically from the preferences of urban voters, and partisan 
gerrymandering may make this disjuncture more pronounced in state 
legislatures.89 
Such political factors are not the only explanation for urban success 
in implementing innovative regulatory policies.  Paul Diller points to 
the structure of local government to explain local innovations in 
public health, noting that the progressive public health agenda faces 
fewer “vetogates” at the local level than it would at state and federal 
levels.90  As Diller observes, city councils are unicameral chambers, 
and super-majority requirements are rare with respect to local 
regulatory policy.91  At the same time, Diller notes that special 
interest groups may have a harder time mobilizing opposition at the 
local level, given the number of local governments, which may help 
enact such policies.92 
There are probably more factors at play here than merely those 
already discussed.  Beyond these progressive regulatory policies, 
other local issues call out for innovative policy solutions.  Looming 
pension problems represent a challenge to local governments as much 
 
 86. Tim Dickinson, Meet the Leaders of the Trump Resistance, ROLLING STONE 
(Jan. 13, 2017, 7:36 P.M.), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
features/meet-the-leaders-of-the-trump-resistance-124691/ [https://perma.cc/5FW9-
C3H5] (noting that “America’s cities have emerged as centers of resistance to 
Trump’s deportation plans” and “[t]he reality is that undocumented immigrants are 
more popular in America’s cities than is the president”). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. Andy Duehren & Brandon Formby, As Lawmakers Try to Curb Local Texas 
Governments, Big-City Mayors Left Out of Meetings with Abbott, TEX. TRIB. (July 
26, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/07/26/lawmakers-curb-local-
governments-abbott-ignores-big-city-mayors/ [https://perma.cc/R99F-NK6J]. 
 89. Brentin Mock, Where Gerrymandering Is Containing City Power, CITYLAB 
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containing-city-power/512621/ [https://perma.cc/UE6V-45CF]. 
 90. Diller, supra note 6, at 1266–67. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1267–69. 
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as state governments, and in many cases, state law restricts the ability 
of local governments to improve the situation.93  In addition, cities, 
especially older cities, have consistently underinvested in 
infrastructure maintenance and improvement.94  Needed 
improvements in municipal water systems have received even less 
attention.95  And of course, in many jurisdictions, adaptations to 
climate change are both needed and not fully accounted for in current 
capital improvement plans.96 
While these problems are well documented, they are not the kinds 
of problems that local leaders want to discuss.  On pensions, for 
example, policymakers reveal a “remarkable degree of ignorance and 
unwillingness to talk about the pension problem.”97  To illustrate this 
 
 93. Of course, there is significant heterogeneity among pension programs, and 
there are also municipalities that do not face pension problems. See Joshua D. Rauh, 
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BRIEF (2015), 
http://ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/files/MAPPR/Integrated%20Asset%20Management%20
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M3W-GYRV]. 
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Infrastructure Report Card, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Drinking-
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CORNELL CLIMATE CHANGE (June 14, 2018), 
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Adaption, U.S. ENVTL. PROT, AGENCY (June 14, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/arc-
x/planning-climate-change-adaptation [https://perma.cc/D3DX-TSE5]. 
 97. Patrick McGuinn, Pension Politics: Public Employee Retirement System 
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problem, consider the current, non-partisan Phoenix mayoral race.  
The non-profit group Truth-in-Accounting gave Phoenix a D grade 
when reviewing its financial health, largely because of the city’s 
pension problems.98 
Local leaders may be primed to focus on new regulatory areas in 
part because their ability to address these bread-and-butter issues of 
local governance is more limited by state law.  For example, most 
states have constitutional provisions that protect pension benefits at 
both the state and local levels.99  Such provisions make it much harder 
for local officials to pass meaningful pension reform.  Similarly, 
placing limits on local fiscal autonomy significantly restricts a local 
government’s ability to invest in infrastructure, as it consequently 
limits their ability to raise revenue.  As local governments attempt to 
come into compliance with Clean Water Act requirements for storm 
water drainage, they have needed to find new sources of income.100 
In this way, hyper preemption legislation may emerge in response 
to an urban regulatory agenda that has already been shaped by the 
constraints of traditional state preemption.  Prior limits on local 
autonomy are now developing the policies that cities try to enact and 
may be pushing cities toward regulatory innovations that lead to the 
new preemption. 
To be clear, these state-law imposed limits on fiscal authority affect 
local governments in both red and blue states.  New York City’s 
struggles to reform public pensions in the wake of state interference 
are at least as difficult as anything encountered in a more traditionally 
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red state.101  While California cities have significant independent 
revenue authority, they are subject to significant restrictions on their 
ability to use their property tax base because of Proposition 13.102  
Further, many of the infrastructure problems facing urban areas are 
regional in nature, and a legion of scholarship has documented the 
difficulties localism poses for challenging regional issues.103 
B. The Half-Empty Glass: Increasing Restrictions on Fiscal Capital 
For all the excitement about progressive regulatory policies 
executed at the local level, fiscal constraints may make it much more 
difficult for a reimagined localism to thrive.  In particular, new 
constraints on local finance are becoming an increasing challenge for 
local governance. 
First, the 2017 tax reform bill limited the state and local tax 
deduction to $10,000.104  This limit places new pressure on local 
governments to keep tax bills low, especially in jurisdictions where 
many tax filers took the state and local tax (“SALT”) deduction.  
Because higher income earners disproportionately benefitted from 
the SALT deduction,105 the cap may also put pressures on them to 
make more regressive changes to their tax structure.  In New Jersey, 
estimates suggest that thirty percent of taxpayers would reach the 
$10,000 cap based on their property taxes alone, while twenty percent 
of New Yorkers pay more than $10,000 in property taxes.106  Other 
states, including many New England states, California, Illinois, and 
Texas, also have significant populations whose property taxes exceed 
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$10,000.107  Moreover, this is before taxpayers consider their state 
(and local) income tax liability. 
While much of the national media coverage has focused on the 
effect of the capped SALT deduction on blue, coastal states, local 
governments across the country have also expressed concern. For 
example, in Ohio, the mayors of nineteen Cleveland suburbs signed a 
letter opposing the limit.108  The mayors argued that repealing the 
SALT deduction would “make it more burdensome and difficult for 
residents and communities to maintain local taxes that are needed to 
support police, fire, public works and public educational services for 
children” and rejected the argument that lower federal tax rates 
would counterbalance benefits to middle-class taxpayers.109  The U.S. 
Conference of Mayors weighed in as well, arguing that changes to the 
SALT deduction disproportionately affect our cities, leaving large 
numbers of middle-class Americans paying more in taxes on dollars 
they will never see in the first place.110 As Professor Matthew J. 
Rossman observed, the SALT deduction reduced the burden of 
higher taxes that middle- and upper-middle class taxpayers often face 
when they choose to live in older cities, with greater legacy costs as a 
result of aging infrastructure, among other issues.111  As a result, he 
argues that “scaling back SALT in concert with doubling the 
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standard deduction may very well choke demand for housing in 
legacy cities.”112 
The deduction cap is an additional constraint on the ability of local 
governments to increase revenue and thus pay for needed local 
services. As a result, local governments may need to cut services.  Of 
course, as the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes, states 
could raise other types of taxes, but “[t]hat would push more costs to 
middle- and low-income people, and make state and local tax systems 
even more regressive overall than they already are.”113 
High-tax states are pursuing several policies to limit the effect on 
the SALT deduction.114  The IRS recently issued guidelines 
suggesting that they will seek to limit such gamesmanship.115  Thus, 
the outcome of many of these legislative fixes is far from clear, and 
local jurisdictions with high property taxes in lower tax states may 
face pressure to cut taxes while lacking support for state-level reforms 
that would relieve some of pressure of the SALT cap. 
Second, the 2017 tax bill exacerbates the federal budget deficit and 
portends another round of federal budget cuts.  The budget cuts will 
affect federal funding to both states and  local governments.116  In 
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other words, the belt-tightening at the federal and state level often 
means that local governments are asked to do more with less money. 
Third, additional state constitutional limits on local tax and 
revenue growth may inhibit the fiscal capacity of cities.  In Texas, the 
governor endorsed a proposal to cap state property tax growth117 in a 
way that almost suggests retribution for local government challenges 
to S.B. 4, the state’s law that limits sanctuary city policies.118  
Considering how state regulatory preemption has quickly become a 
nationwide trend,119 it would not be surprising if more restrictions on 
tax authority are in the works.120 
III.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
What do fiscal constraints mean for local government power?  It is, 
of course, impossible to predict the future.  As the old joke goes, 
economists have predicted nine of the last three recessions.  
Nevertheless, advocates of increased local autonomy should be 
thinking critically about the ways in which these constraints will shape 
the urban agenda in the coming decades.  This Part first explores the 
ways these constraints will affect both traditionally local issues and 
the newer urban efforts to enforce progressive regulation.  It will then 
consider the ways these fiscal constraints may shape the local-state 
relationship going forward. 
Fiscal constraints have a direct impact on the amount of money 
available to be spent on local services.  As discussed in Part II, local 
governments are facing both legal and practical constraints on their 
ability to generate higher revenue from taxes, and they may meet 
reductions in intergovernmental transfers from state and federal 
sources in the coming years.121 
At the same time, there will be new demands on city budgets, 
including pension obligations and upgrading or replacing aging 
infrastructure.  Advocates of pension reform have long warned of the 
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day when pension obligations would threaten the funding of bread-
and-butter local services.122  Pension problems affect cities of all sizes.  
For example, tiny Bisbee, Arizona (population 5312 in 2016) had the 
state’s largest percentage of unfunded liability in the Pension 
Retirement System, owing $10,115,918 to its retired firefighters and 
$7,810,435 to its retired police officers as of January 2017.123  
Meanwhile, New York City (population 8,622,698 as of July 2017124) 
spent more than seventeen percent of its tax dollars on pension 
obligations in 2017 and still faced a significant shortfall.125  There are 
heated debates over the amount of unfunded pension liability in the 
United States.126  Estimates vary because there is considerable 
uncertainty about the rate of return governments can achieve on 
current assets.127  Those most alarmed by the pension crisis fear that 
city projects rely on unreasonably rosy rates of return and thus 
unfunded liability is much greater than the amount that local 
governments report.128  To close this gap, local governments must 
either cut pensions (a politically difficult task) or raise revenue (also 
problematic).  Because pension funding does not increase currently 
provided local services, it is possible local taxpayers could face rising 
tax bills and shrinking service levels, which is a recipe for tax flight. 
The potential for service cuts, tax increases, and the accompanying 
fiscal challenges are the most talked about consequences of urban 
fiscal constraints, but they are not the only consequences.  Facing 
 
 122. See generally Stephen D. Eide, California Crowd-Out: How Rising 
Retirement Benefit Costs Threaten Municipal Services, MANHATTAN (Apr. 16, 
2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/california-crowd-out-5878.html 
[https://perma.cc/G7D2-C9Z6] (discussing this problem in California local 
governments). 
 123. See Eric Petermann, Looming Pension Liabilities Threaten Local 
Governments, HERALD/REV. MEDIA (Jan. 29, 2017), 
https://www.myheraldreview.com/news/looming-pension-liabilities-threaten-local-
governments/article_b7790442-e5d3-11e6-9082-c78f3ad18c90.html 
[https://perma.cc/5TK3-CXCM]. 
 124. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, New York City, New York, July 1, 2017, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork/PST045217 
[https://perma.cc/F6V2-GAU7]. 
 125. The exact size of the shortfall is disputed. Walsh & Russell, supra note 101. 
 126. See, e.g., id. (discussing issue with reference to New York City’s pension 
obligations); Andrew Biggs, U.S. State and Local Pensions Fund at Only Half the 
Levels of Some OECD Countries, FORBES (May 10, 2016, 2:59 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbiggs/2016/05/10/u-s-state-local-pensions-much-
less-well-funded-than-government-employee-plans-in-oecd-countries/#365606b84e0d 
[https://perma.cc/8YZH-RFLM]. 
 127. Biggs, supra note 126; see Walsh & Russell, supra note 101. 
 128. See Biggs, supra note 126. 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1293 
these challenges requires significant investments of policy resources 
and political capital address, and such efforts will necessarily compete 
with other kinds of local policy experimentation.  For example, 
Houston’s pension reform efforts have been heralded as a national 
model,129 and these reforms took months of protracted negotiations 
between the public employee unions and city officials.  The reform 
package then required approval from the state legislature,130 and the 
legislature, in turn, required the city to seek approval for its proposed 
$1 billion pension bond from city voters.131  If voters had rejected the 
bond, the city would have been back where it started.  But even after 
all that work, the city’s fiscal problems are not entirely resolved.  If 
the city’s pension fund has a lower rate of return than expected or a 
better rate of return, that affects the city’s contributions to the 
pension fund.  If the contribution level must change by more than five 
percent in either direction, then the city and the public sector unions 
must go back to the table to renegotiate for a quicker pay down of 
debt or a reduction in benefits.132 Moreover, these pension reforms do 
not affect the city’s responsibility to pay for health care for its 
retirees.133  Other cities facing significant pension problems may find 
even more stumbling blocks to success.  As a result, these cities may 
either continue to drain political capital in an effort to solve the 
problem or face an increasingly dire fiscal situation, and city 
leadership will have less time and fewer resources to focus on other 
kinds of policy leadership.  It is, after all, hard to implement a new 
regulatory agenda in a city facing severe fiscal problems. 
At the same time, resource constraints can also fuel creative 
problem-solving.  It was Houston’s mayor Sylvester Turner’s frank 
discussion of the prospect of municipal bankruptcy that brought the 
parties to the table to negotiate pension reform.134 Already, for 
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example, the cap on the SALT deduction is driving renewed interest 
in municipal consolidation in New Jersey.135 
More broadly, increasing fiscal problems may reinforce the 
justifications for limiting local power in the first place.  States 
certainly have an interest in local finance distress as such distress 
influences the state economy and may also affect state tax collection.  
But one can imagine such arguments gaining purchase, especially in 
locales where the climate is already hostile to local policy autonomy.  
Of course, given states’ own struggles with pensions, there is no 
reason to assume that states are better equipped to resolve these 
issues than cities.  To the extent that cities face increasing fiscal 
problems, however, state officials are unlikely to blame themselves 
and the limited authority they granted local government to raise 
revenue.  Rather, state officials may find it all too easy to push 
through more limits on local revenue to force local governments to 
spend wisely and thereby solve fiscal problems without increasing 
state aid to localities. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken collectively, these fiscal constraints suggest that cities are 
uniquely vulnerable in our federalist system, saddled with significant, 
and perhaps increasing, responsibilities and limited in the revenue 
sources they have to pay for them.  Advocates of a prominent 
regulatory role for cities must grapple with these fiscal constraints.  
These constraints drain city resources, making it more difficult for 
cities to pursue and expand their regulatory agenda. 
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